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"INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST":
A LOOK AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
MARK R. JOELSON*

Recent developments involving the application of United States antitrust law to foreign firms have provoked a search by many for a distinct, if hitherto undiscovered, discipline called "international antitrust."
In truth, the establishment of an international body of law is as elusive
and distant in the case of antitrust as it is in other facets of international
law. Thus, the primary concern of the American lawyer continues to
be with the application and impact of national laws, usually United
States law, on international business transactions. If private international
law is, as has been suggested, simply the practice of local law for clients
with foreign names, then it can fairly be said that international antitrust is no more than the practice of United States antitrust law for
combines with exotic labels, such as Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor
Chemische Industrie.1
Nevertheless, as recent developments attest, antitrust as a subject for
international concern and cooperation has developed quite rapidly. It
is no longer an esoteric and largely academic field of study but a part
of everyday business transactions. Today, the American businessman
is aware that he must participate and compete in the context of an international business community, an awareness that has been more keenly
felt by businessmen in countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom which have been compelled to carry on overseas trade to survive.
Meanwhile, our antitrust law and some foreign antitrust law, notably
that of the European Economic Community, has been maturing and
has become more stringent. The resulting interplay between international transactions and national antitrust policy was inevitable and is
only beginning to generate sparks.
This phenomenon creates problems on two major levels. The most
obvious difficulty is that posed for the international firm which must
thread its operations around the world through different, and often
conflicting, national antitrust policies and rules. Secondly, these differences in antitrust policy have given rise to equally thorny problems
* A3. (cum laude), Harvard University, 1955; LL.B. (cum laude), Harvard University, 1958; Diploma in Law, Oxford University, 1962; Fullbright Scholar, 1962; Member of the firm: Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin and Kahn, Washington, D.C. Appreciation
is expressed for the assistance of Mr. Eugene J. Meigher.
1. United States v. N. V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 5
TR"n REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,181 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1970).
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at the governmental level, and the responsible enforcement agencies
have been forced to take steps to reduce the likelihood of conflict and
to accommodate the interests of other countries.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Turning to the developments in United States law, there have been
a host of recent actions that have given pause to American businessmen
with overseas activities, as well as to foreign firms seeking commerce
in the United States. The BP-Sobio, Litton,' and other antimerger
proceedings, the establishment of a patent unit in the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, and the Westinghouse4 and Painton5
cases are causing businessmen to view new international arrangements
with some trepidation. In addition, these developments are cause for
anxiety about the enforceability of existing patent and "know-how"
licensing arrangements throughout the world.
In analyzing the recent cases, it appears that the international aspects
of the cases are incidental to the enforcement of the antitrust policy
involved, rather than central to it. Nevertheless, the impact of the
actions on the international business community has been substantial, bringing uncertainty and confusion in their wake.

Mergers
Considerable anxiety has recently been expressed by businessmen
in the United States and abroad over the spate of government antimerger
actions involving foreign companies. While the government's increased
activity in this sector is noteworthy, examination reveals that the government complaints in question have been more remarkable for their
number than for their novelty. In large measure, the recent series of
mergers cases is attributable to the maturation of basic Clayton Act,
Section 7 doctrine through domestic merger cases. In addition, there
is the increased emphasis which the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has placed on foreign competition as a valuable
antidote to the ills arising from domestic concentration. As long as
the Division regards existing or potential competition from abroad as
2. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
72,988 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 1, 1970).
3. Litton Indus., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP.
18,729 (FTC
April 11, 1969).
4. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [Transfer Binder, U. S. Antitrust Cases
Summaries 1961-19701 TRADE REG. REP. Case 2095 (N.D. Cal. April 22, 1970).
5. Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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one of the principal remedies against existing concentration, foreigncompany acquisitions are likely to come under close scrutiny.
A review of these merger complaints shows that, with the exception
of United States v. Gillette Co.," their underlying legal theories were
quite conventional. This is not to say that the economic effects alleged
in those complaints are not the subject of legitimate controversy. But
it is quite apparent that the government has not turned to novel theories
when dealing with foreign-company acquisitions.
Several of the government complaints fied against foreign corporations have been premised upon commonplace theories of elimination of
direct competition within the United States. An example is the Federal
Trade Commission's section 7 complaint against Litton Industries for
its acquisition of Triumph-Adler, a German typewriter manufacturer.'
In 1965, Litton acquired Royal-McBee Corporation, at that time the
second largest firm in the concentrated typewriter industry. The immediate effect of the German acquisition was to combine Litton's
existing operations, which accounted for about 19.5 per cent of total
typewriter sales in 1967, with those of Triumph-Adler, which was itself
allegedly a significant factor in the American market.
Similarly, the government filed a section 7 suit against CIBA and J. R.
Geigy, two Swiss corporations, and their American subsidiaries. The
action was based upon the fact that the wholly-owned American subsidiaries were directly competing in the manufacture and sale of dyestuffs, anti-hypertensive drugs, herbicides, and optical brightening agents
in the United States.8
Potential competition theory has already begun to appear in foreigncompany merger complaints, and it can be expected to play an increasingly significant role. The government suit against the British Petroleum-Sohio acquisition, for example, was predicated upon both actual
and potential competition.' According to the government, both Sohio
and "BP" were direct competitors in the sale of gasoline in western
Pennsylvania with sales accounting for 10.3 per cent and 3.5 per cent
respectively of all gasoline sales in that state in 1968. In addition, BP
6. [Transfer Binder, U. S. Antitrust Cases Summaries 1961-1970] TRADE REC. REP.
Case 1988 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 1968).
18,729 (FTC
7. Litton Indus., Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
April 11, 1969). See also United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129
(N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curian, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
8. United States v. CIBA Corp., 5 TRADE RrG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 1 73,269
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1970).
9. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 5 TaDnE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
72,988 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 1, 1970).
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was alleged to be a potential entrant into the highly concentrated Ohio
market, which was contiguous to BP's existing marketing territory,
and where Sohio accounted for over 30 per cent of total gasoline sales.
The significance of this last theory is reflected in the divestiture provided
for in the decree settling the case. Divestiture is not to be confined to
western Pennsylvania, the area of actual competitive overlap, but also
is to embrace Ohio, in which Sohio is required to disgorge some of its
stations. Again, the case is not novel in terms of American antitrust
law, but the strong reaction in British and European business circles
suggested that the international repercussions are significant, and that a
fertile ground for misunderstanding exists in the antimerger area.
While the preceding cases represent a rather conventional application
of merger theory, the government's suit contesting the Gillette Company's acquisition of the Braun Co. seems to illustrate a bolder application of potential competition theory. Gillette is, of course, the leading
American manufacturer of safety razors and blades. Braun, prior to
the acquisition, manufactured electric razors in West Germany but,
pursuant to a 1954 licensing and distribution agreement with the Ronson Corp., was not permitted to sell electric razors in the United States
until January 1, 1976. One of the striking aspects of the case is the
government's theory as to the relevant product market, in that it
embraced both wet and dry shaving instruments. While wet razors and
electric razors are meant to perform identical functions, it is doubtful,
as a practical matter, that to a user of blades an electric razor represents
an acceptable substitute. Conversely, it is doubtful that a long-time
user of electric razors can be regarded as a potential purchaser of blades.
Thus, the only substantial head-on competition between wet and dry
shaving instruments is in the effort to win the beginning shaver.
The validity of the government's definition of relevant product market notwithstanding, there was little basis for calling Braun a potential
entrant into the United States. Under the license agreement with Ronson, which the government did not attack, Braun was barred for some
time from entry into the United States market. Moreover, the relatively poor showing by Ronson with the Braun razor in the American
market cast further doubt upon Braun's potential in this market, since
there was no reason to expect that Braun would be more successful in
marketing such a razor than would Ronson.
In sum, the government's recent merger suits involving foreign
corporations have been more significant for their number than for the
theories on which they were based. While Gillette provides an excep-

1971]

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

tion to the rule, the action in that case is probably in large measure
attributable to the persistence of a very high degree of concentration
in the shaving instrument market and to Gillette's continuing dominance
of that market.
Licensing of Patentsand Know-How
Numerous foreign corporations have been caught up in the curent
government enforcement efforts with respect to license agreements,
and it appears likely that developments in the law affecting the licensing
of patented and nonpatented technology will have a more pervasive
influence upon international commerce than will future antimerger
actions. Except for the Westinghouse case, it can be said that the competitive consequences alleged in these cases have been entirely upon
domestic commerce and that the cases have lacked the broad international
flavor of the older conspiracy cases, like Timken'0 and ICI.11 Nevertheless, firms throughout the world are today reviewing their know-how
and patent license agreements which, though lawful and enforceable
under foreign laws, may be void to the extent that they touch on
American commerce.
In the case of the government's patent program, the private bar has
received considerable assistance from the speeches of Antitrust Division
officials in anticipating the kinds of licensing provisions which will be
undergoing re-examination. On the other hand, the full import of the
Supreme Court's holdings in Lear Inc. v. Adkins' 2 and Zenith Radio

Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc."3 is not so evident.
The initial phase of the government's current patent program has
been to attack particular kinds of provisions frequently found in patent
licenses, the lawfulness of which under the antitrust laws could be
questioned without attacking the license agreements as a whole. The
government's position has been most stringent with respect to restrictions imposed upon the resale of license products. In such cases the
government relies upon the proposition that, since the first authorized
sale of a pitented article exhausts the patent monopoly,-4 further restrictions may not be imposed upon the purchaser by the patentee
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
395 U.S. 653 (1969).
395 U.S. 100 (1969).
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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seller. For example, in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 5 the government successfully argued that forbidding a licensee who has purchased the licensed product to resell it in bulk form is per se illegal.
This government position against restraints on alienation is established
in domestic precedents and recently received further impetus in United
States v. Arnold Sch'winn & Co."
The Antitrust Division is also interested in developing some law in
connection with a variety of similar restrictions upon manufacturer licensees where the "restraint on alienation" theory is not directly applicable.
These restrictions may take the form of preventing such licensees from
selling the licensed product in bulk, or through certain channels of
distribution, or to certain classes of customers or in particular fields of
use. As to the latter type of restriction, Assistant Attorney General
McLaren has expressed the view that, while "there may be some justification for a patentee reserving for himself a well-defined field out of
the various potential applications for his invention, it is difficult to see
how justification can be shown for the type of restriction which divides
fields of use among licensees who otherwise would compete." '7 There
have been a number of recent cases, several in the international area, attacking licensing restrictions of this type.' 8
The recent complaint against the Westinghouse and Mitsubishi companies,1 9 with it allegations of an extensive arrangement between the
parties to avoid competition in various territories, is more akin to the
older international conspiracy cases than to the government's other
recent patent cases. In addition to the basic issue of non-competition,
the complaint presents a host of interesting antitrust issues, including
15. 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969). See also United States v. Farbenfabriken Bayer
A. G., TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 72,918 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1969).
16. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
17. McLaren, Patent Licenses and Antitrust Considerations, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT RESEARCH INSTITUTE Or GEO. WASH. U. (1969).
18. United States v. Ciba Corp., [Transfer Binder, U. S. Antitrust Cases Summaries
1961-1970] TRADE REG. REP. Cases 2058, 2059 (D.N.J. July 9, 1969), involving allegations that licensees were precluded from selling certain drugs in bulk form and otherwise than in specified combinations; United States v. Fisons Ltd., [Transfer Binder,
U. S. Antitrust Cases Summaries 1961-19701 TRADE REG. REP. Case 2067 (N.D. Ill.
July 23, 1969), involving an alleged agreement by a British company and American
pharmaceutical firms to allocate fields of sale and restrict sale of the product in bulk
form. See also United States v. Ziegler, [Transfer Binder, U. S. Antitrust Cases Summaries 1961-1970] TRADE REG. REP. Case 2097 (D.D.C. April 24, 1970), attacking the
licensing of certain process patents on conditions which restrict competition in the
sale of the unpatented product resulting from the process.
19. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [Transfer Binder, U. S. Antitrust
Cases Summaries 1961-1970] TRADE REG. REP. Case 2095 (N.D. Cal. April 22, 1970).
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the payment of royalties on products not made under the licensed
technology, territorially determined royalty differentials, and licensing
of patents along national lines. Despite the furor that followed issuance
of the complaint the case does not seem to hold broad ramifications for
the international business community, because the Antitrust Division
apparently views the Westinghouse case as a hard-core and long-term
conspiracy situation rather than as a new departure. There are some
noteworthy features in the complaint's request for relief, to which reference will later be made.
It is submitted that the largest storm cloud with respect to most international technology exchanges is created, not by the Westinghouse
complaint, but by the uncertainty generated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkin. 20 The Lear holding on the patent issues
is important, 21 but, from the international businessman's viewpoint, the
most significant impact of the case may stem from what it did not decide
-the question of whether the transfer of nonpatented technology is adequate consideration for a royalties contract. While the Court confined
itself to posing tantalizing questions about the compatibility of such
agreements with patent policy, Mr. Justice Black, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, flatly stated that ". . . private arrangements
under which self-styled 'inventors' do not keep their discoveries secret,
but rather disclose them, in return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws. . ," 22 Although this issue is not
peculiar to foreign trade, the effect of Mr. Justice Black's position, if
adopted by the Court, could be devastating upon the massive international trade in nonpatented technology. It is interesting to note that
in the one reported case in which Mr. Justice Black's position was
adopted, the nonpatented information had been licensed by an American firm to a British licensee.2s In that case, the district judge reasoned
that, under the rationale of Lear, enforcement of a royalty agreement
with respect to the use of unpatented technology would be contrary
to our national patent law and policy.
Since Lear, the comments of Antitrust Division personnel indicate
a reluctance to press for a rule that royalty payments in exchange for
nonpatented technology are unenforceable. The government position
20. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
21. The case, of course, was the death knell of the licensee estoppel doctrine. Not
only is a no-contest clause in a license agreement unenforceable, but questions are now
raised as to whether such clauses may be a basis for antitrust vulnerability.
22. 395 U.S. at 677.
23. Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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appears to be that state law can legitimately protect ideas that are valuable and rise to the level of a trade secret.24 This question, however, will
probably have to be ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court.
At this juncture, all that may safely be said is that for reasons of
equity-giving some recognition to the inventor for his efforts-and
because of the commercial significance of facilitating the exploitation
of unpatented technology through licensing, it seems unlikely that the
Court will adopt a rule that would put an end to such licensing. On the
other hand, such licenses are likely to receive more careful scrutiny in
the future. Perhaps the standards suggested by Mr. McLaren-that the
idea be a genuine and valuable secret; that the license be unencumbered
by any unreasonable restriction and not of excessive duration-may be
adopted by the Court.
Related Problems
While developments in the substantive areas of merger enforcement
and licensing have generated the most comment, there have been other
recent developments related to application of United States antitrust laws
to foreign companies. Two procedural areas of some importance are
those relating to remedies and to the proper scope of the government's
investigatory powers. In some respects these problem areas are more
sensitive than those previously discussed. For example, as the government extends its authority into matters involving foreign parties, its
investigatory powers become more susceptible to challenge. Hence, as
the government's merger and patent programs move on to more complex matters involving overseas companies the government's subpoena
and civil investigative demand powers will probably be tested in this
context.

The use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain documents held by a
German branch of an American bank was considered in United States

•v. First National City Bank. 25 The Court of Appeals confirmed that a
federal court has the power to require the production of documents

located in foreign countries, if it has in personam jurisdiction over the
24. Address by Bruce B. Wilson, Patents and Antitrust: The Legitimate Bounds of the
Lawful Monopoly, Patent Law Ass'n of Pittsburgh, Nov. 19, 1969; address by Richard
W. McLaren, Common Law Protection of Unpatented Ideas, Symposium on Patent
Law, Sept. 26, 1969. See also address by Mr. McLaren, Competition in the Foreign
Commerce of the United States, Symposium on Antitrust and Related Issues and their
Solutions in International Trade and Productive Investment, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, Williamsburg, Va., Oct. 16, 1970.
25. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
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person in possession of the documents. However, as the Court of Appeals' opinion reveals, the outcome in any such case turns on delicate considerations of jurisdiction, choice of law principles, the relevant law of
foreign states and acute questions of timing. In this case, the court
had to balance American antitrust law, which it referred to as a cornerstone of United States economic policy, against German bank secrecy
tradition (with a common law and private litigation context), an exercise which brought forth a clear result. On the other hand, had
the bank been in jeopardy of criminal prosecution in the foreign state
for delivering the documents, the outcome would probably have been
different. Another important factor was that neither the State Department nor the German government had expressed an international interest in the matter.
The City Bank case is probably only the opening round in a battle
over the scope of the subpoena power as it relates to documents abroad
and to foreign corporations. The record in the Gillette case might
also prove illustrative of the difficulties of obtaining documents and
testimony outside the United States.
Similar questions might also be raised with respect to the government's powers under the Civil Investigative Demand statute. 26 The
dimensions of these powers have been largely untested. However, successful resistance to this authority in domestic situations may stimulate
27
challenges to similar investigations in the international commerce area.
The problem of remedies also warrants special attention. Remedies
in merger cases, when applied to foreign companies, may cause particular irritation abroad, because many other nations have attitudes
toward mergers and acquisitions which differ from those of the United
States. Even where antitrust law affecting restrictive trade practices is
relatively well developed abroad, antimerger law tends to be nonexistent, embryonic, or simply unenforced. For reasons that are readily
apparent, in light of the acquisition onslaught upon European business
by American companies, sensitivity abroad to a United States antitrust
challenge is greatest when the foreign corporation is the acquiring company. The American government has sought to alleviate this problem
in recent cases by circumspectly tailoring its terms of settlement, thereby
curing the alleged violation without preventing the merger. Standard
26. Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 548, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1311-14 (1964).
27. See Petition of Union Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Cal. 1963), aft'd, 343 F.2d
29 (9th Cir. 1965); Chattanooga Pharm. Ass'n v. United States, TRADE REG. REP. (1965

Trade Cas.)

71,524 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 1965), aff'd 358 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1966).
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Oil Co. (Ohio) is a case in point, since divestiture was carefully limited
in order to excise the alleged violation. This precision in approach may
not seem remarkable until one recalls the Justice Department's general
preference for stopping objectionable mergers altogether, rather than
surgically removing the offending part.
While the recent patent licensing cases illustrate a wide variety of
relief, the requested relief has been directed for the most part toward
domestic commerce, because the alleged violations were considered to
have their effects only on domestic commerce. In addition to an adjudication that there has been a violation and an injunction against the
alleged violation, the stipulations commonly sought have been the extension of injunctions beyond the products involved in the complaint,
mandatory licensing of all bona fide applicants, and prohibitions against
the use of no-contest clauses.
The requested relief in the Westinghouse complaint is very sweeping
and expressly concerned with international commerce. The essence of
the complaint is a general understanding between the defendants providing for exchange of valuable technology in return for mutual promises
not to compete with each other in specified areas. The requested relief
would remedy this arrangement by compelling each to license the other
nonrestrictively, thereby enabling Westinghouse to compete with Mitsubishi in Japan and Mitsubishi with Westinghouse in the United States.
The noteworthy aspect of the requested relief is that the court order
of reciprocal licensing would extend to the present and future Japanese patents of both parties.2 ' Whether a court should issue so farreaching an order involves a delicate question of fashioning relief which
has to be somewhat accommodated to the public policy of the foreign
states involved. It would seem that such relief, applying not only to a
foreign company but also to the patent framework of another country,
should be reserved for only the most aggravated violations of United
States antitrust law.
Tim EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The overseas development of antitrust law has increased in various
areas as industrialized societies have come to recognize that maintenance of competition is a sine qua non of a free enterprise system. The
steps taken by the Common Market hold particular interest for the
28. For a controversial precedent, see United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See also W. L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AN'D THE
ANrrRusT LAws 87 (1958).
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United States because of the economic importance of the nations participating, and also because a truly international system of antitrust is
involved. Since the Treaty of Rome became effective in 1958,20 it is
apparent that the European Economic Community (EEC) has made
some substantial strides in establishing a basic antitrust framework, and
in grappling with the more thorny areas that antitrust enforcement
entails.
Enforcement of the EEC's antitrust rules is delegated to the EEC
Commission. The EEC antitrust rules apply to agreements and practices
which tend to adversely affect trade between the member states or otherwise restrain competition within the Common Market. National antitrust
laws do, however, continue to exist in the member states, and it is not
yet clear in which situations the existence of the EEC antitrust law
preempts application of national law. The Court of Justice of the
Communities, which is vested with authority to interpret the Rome
Treaty, ruled in the "dyestuff cases" that the national antitrust authorities may enforce their own laws even where an EEC action is pending
against the same parties, provided that the national action in no way
impairs the application of the EEC law and remedies.30
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits, as incompatible with
the Common Market, anticompetitive agreements and practices which
restrict trade between the member states, including such specified acts
as price fixing, production control, and market allocation. However,
the EEC Commission is empowered to grant a firm an antitrust exemption from this prohibition where the latter establishes that the agreement
or practice
helps to improve the production or distribution of goods or to promote technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting profit and does not:
(a) subject the concerns in question to any restrictions which
are not indispensable to the achievement of the above objectives; or
(b) enable such concerns to eliminate competition in respect
of a substantial part of the goods concerned. 31
29. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, English translation in 1 CCH CoMmoN MKT
151-5473 (1965).
30. The difficulties that will arise from application of this concept can be seen. For
a detailed consideration of the preemption problem, see the excellent discussion by an
official of the German Federal Cartel Office, Markert, The Dyestuff Case: A Contribution to the Relationship Between the Antitrust Laws of the European Economic
Conmmunity, 14 THE ANT TRUSr Burr. 869 (1969).
31. Treaty of Rome, art. 85 (3), March 25, 1957, English translation in 1 CCH
REP.

CommoN MiT REP. 12051 (1965).
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Also pertinent is Article 86 of the Treaty which prohibits firms or
groups of firms from improperly exploiting a dominant economic position that they may have attained within the Common Market or a part
of it. This provision has seen less use than Article 85 and, by United
States antitrust standards, it appears to be saddled with some major
built-in limitations because, as its terms relating to abuse of dominance
indicate, it is by no means an incipiency rule. Indeed, the EEC Commission recently acknowledged, in connection with the Litton acquisition of the German typewriter company, 32 that, unlike American law,
the provisions of the Treaty of Rome offer only limited powers for
dealing with merger matters. Nonetheless, there are signs that the Commission will try to apply Article 86 to a merger situation in the near
future.
The EEC Commission has, through the years, been developing the
framework of its antitrust law by enunciating certain general principles
regarding the application of Article 85 to various types of practices.
For example, the Commission ruled in 1962, that suppliers were free
to enter into contracts for exclusive representation by commercial
agents, without violating the prohibition of Article 85. 3 3 As this rule
applied to dealings with commercial agents (e.g., manufacturers' representatives) and not to those with independent merchants, this initial
step did not represent a difficult antitrust judgment.
Also worth noting is the Official Notice issued by the Commission
in 1962 declaring certain clauses in patent licensing agreements to be
unobjectionable from the antitrust point of view. ' There are several
types of clauses which United States government officials have indicated an intention to attack; namely, quantity limitations and restriction of the license to specified technical fields.
Then, in 1967, the Commission set out certain exemptions which
would apply to exclusive dealing arrangements with distributors and
other independent parties. 5 The regulations issued recite that exclusive
dealing arrangements relating to international commerce generally
lead to an improvement in distribution effectiveness, and therefore declare as exempt the normal types of bilateral agreements providing for
32. See text accompanying note 7, supra.
33. Official Notice on Contracts for Exclusive Representation Concluded with Commercial Agents, OFFIcrAL J. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. 139 (Dec. 24, 1962) in 1 CCH
COMMON MKT REP. 2697 (1965).
34. Id.
35. EEC Reg. No. 67/67 (Mar. 22, 1967), OFFiciAL J. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES No.
57 (Mar. 25, 1967) in 1 CCH COMMON MKT REP. 2727 (1967).
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exclusive selling or buying rights. Certain related ancillary restrictions
are permitted including the obligation by the buyer not to establish a
branch or distribution depot or advertise "outside the territory which
is the subject" of the exclusive concession3 6
On the enforcement side, two important actions by the EEC Commission have been those relating to the quinine and the dyestuff cartels.
Like the United States, the Common Market authorities have taken
action against Dutch, German, and French companies for agreeing to
fix prices, control production and allocate markets in quinine and
quinidine throughout the world. The Commission's decision held the
agreements to be unlawful under Article 85, and it assessed fines against
each of the companies in the light of the market position of each company and its degree of responsibility for the infringements.
The dyestuffs case involved simultaneous price increases within the
Common Market by ten major manufacturers of coloring elements.
The Commission found the existence of a conspiracy which set identical prices, introduced them in the different Common Market countries
at virtually the same time, and which was followed to the point that
the participating manufacturers instructed their subsidiaries and representatives in identical terms. The Commission ruled that Article 85 had
been violated and imposed fines on the German, French, Italian, Swiss,
and British manufacturers involved."8 The extension of the penalty to
the Swiss and British companies represented the first time that such
action has been taken against firms headquartered in nonmember countries. The Commission thought it appropriate to include these companies in the scope of its decision because the anticompetitive acts in
which they had engaged were such as to affect Common Market trade.
In many respects Common Market antitrust law and enforcement are
pale in terms of both severity and quantity when compared to United
36. Cf. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
37. EEC Comm'n Decision of July 16, 1969, OFFicrAL J. EUROPFAN COMMUNrIS No.
L 192 (Aug. 5, 1969) in [Transfer Binder, 1965-1969 New Developments] CCH CovMOI MKT REP.
9313 (1969). Proceedings were also opened in the German Federal

Cartel Office against certain aspects of the international quinine cartel, but there was
no finding of violations of the German Cartel laws within the given period. Therefore,
the problem of duplication of fines with the EEC ruling was not presented. For the
United States litigation, see United States v. N. V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor
Chemische Industrie, 5 TRADE Rm. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.)
73,181 (S.D.N.Y. July 8,
1970).
38. EEC Comm'n Decision of July 24, 1969, OFFicrAL J. EURoPEAN COMMUNITIES No.
L 195 (Aug. 1, 1969) in [Transfer Binder, 1965-1969 New Developments] CCH ComiMON MKT REP.
9314 (1969).
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States antitrust effort. The Common Market's antitrust development
is impressive and promising, however, when viewed, not comparatively,
but in context. The infancy of the European Economic Community
itself, the lack of any consistent and stringent antitrust tradition on the
part of a number of the member states, and the truly international character-with all the attendant problems-of the antitrust law which they
are developing must be taken into consideration.
INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

It is clear that worldwide intergovernmental cooperation in antitrust
matters is still in an early stage of development. For some time, efforts
have been made under the aegis of the United Nations to develop an
international arrangement for dealing with restrictive business practices
which affect international trade. However, these efforts, which began
with the Havana Charter, 9 have thus far foundered in their ambitious
attempts to create a world antitrust organization and an enforceable,
internationally-accepted antitrust code. Demonstrably, the obstacles
presented to the development of appropriate international institutions
are formidable, ranging from the basic problem that confronts us with
respect to all international organizations-the reluctance of states to
yield their sovereignty to an international body-to the problem of
agreeing upon and defining the antitrust improprieties, and, finally, that
of formulating acceptable and effective procedures.
The more recent efforts in the area have been perhaps more realistic,
in that they have focused on establishing and improving consultation,
liaison, and avoidance of conflict with respect to national enforcement
action. Much useful work in this regard has been initiated through the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
In 1967, the OECD recommended international cooperation in three
areas: (1) exchange of information concerning restrictive practices;
(2) notification by each country of those antitrust actions which might
affect important interests of another country; and (3) coordination of
enforcement actions by the individual states to the extent feasible.
The regular meetings of the Restrictive Business Practices Committee
of the OECD and of its subcommittees have proved a useful forum for
the exchange of information among the antitrust officials of various
countries and the development of pertinent studies. Notification and
consultation have also progressed as contemplated by the 1967 recom39. Havana Charter for an Int'l Trade Org., ch. V, Dep't of State Pub. 3206, Cornmercial Policy Series 114 (1948). See also 16 U. N. ECOSOC, U. N. Doc. 2380 (1953).
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mendation. For its part, the United States has maintained liaison with
overseas authorities for this purpose, often through informal means,
including exchanges of visits and conferences, and in other instances
through specific bilateral arrangements which are utilized reciprocally
to avoid conflicts in antitrust enforcement.
Current emphasis, then, is largely on the prevention of the international misunderstanding which may and has arisen from the enforcement
of antitrust policy. This is essentially a limited goal, but it is a very
important one which must be pursued and attained if the more elusive
solution, a widespread acceptance of antitrust principles and the international institutionalization of such principles, is ever to be achieved.

